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Recent empirical work increasingly points to imperfect intellectual property rights
as an important determinant of ￿rms￿ organization and integration strategy.
This paper argues that imperfect intellectual property rights, and the ensuing im-
portance of reducing information leakages outside innovating ￿rms, are at the core
of recent trends towards increased decentralization of ￿rms. We further argue that
in this process of decentralization ￿rms change the mechanisms they use in order to
achieve protection of intellectual property. In particular, parallel to decentralization,
￿rms move from the reliance on secrecy within the ￿rm and the large-scale investment
in inanimate assets (which discourage competition and therefore also information leak-
ages), to a strategy of information sharing inside the ￿rm and intensive use of employ-
ees￿ stock options and monetary incentive schemes (which facilitates the retention of
information inside the ￿rm). This implies that ￿rm decentralization correlates with a
transformation in the process of employees￿ skill acquisition within the ￿rm, which is
accelerated under decentralization.
Imperfect intellectual property rights are relevant for ￿rm organization because
they imply that entrepreneurs face a threat of information leakages, initiated typically
by employees inside the ￿rm, towards external agents. The interest of the entrepreneur
is therefore to eﬃciently distort the scope of collusive communication between ￿rm￿s
members and non-members. If communication takes the form of direct collusive com-
munication between employees and non-members, the entrepreneur has an interest in
undertaking strategic actions and investments that erode the collusion stake.
We consider three types of entrepreneur￿s actions oriented to retaining intellec-
tual property in the ￿rm through the erosion of collusion stakes: employees￿ incentive
schemes, the strategic investment in physical assets (capacity) and the extent of infor-
mation releases to employees by the entrepreneur (which is our characterization of
decentralization).
Our main result is that under a sensible speci￿cation of the strategic interaction,
the strategies of capacity (sinking the cost of physical assets) and centralization (em-
ployees are partially informed by the entrepreneur) complement each other, whereas
the strategy of incentive schemes is substitute of the other two. This implies that
two distinct types of ￿rms predominate: physical assets intensive ￿rms that are cen-
tralized and give ￿at wages to diskilled employees (we label such ￿rms traditional),
and human capital intensive ￿rms that are decentralized and give strong incentives to
employees, which have skills similar to those of the entrepreneur. We label this second
type the knowledge ￿rm. An additional implication is that there is a discontinuity
in the optimal organizational form as a function of the cost of entry and the level of
technological development. Under high entry cost and low technological development
the traditional ￿rm is more pro￿table than the knowledge ￿rm, but, beyond a given
treshold, decreases in entry costs or increases in technological development make the
organization of the knowledge ￿rm superior to that of the traditional ￿rm.
ECB Working Paper Series No 43 l  February 2001                                                                7In terms of implications for public policy, two conclusions are drawn from the
analysis. First, the model suggests that restrictions to use stock option schemes and,
more generally, restrictions to wage ￿exibility inside the ￿rm have welfare reducing
eﬀects. Second, we ￿nd that competition policy (in addition to the conventional eﬀects
on price setting by ￿rms) facilitates the promotion of the ￿knowledge ￿rm￿, since entry
barriers are the leading obstacle for the success of the decentralization strategy.
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A number of structural transformations have been witnessed in the last years in the
most developed economies, most notably in the US. Regarding macroeconomic aggre-
gates, the growth of productivity has accelerated since 1995 in the US (see for instance
Gordon (2000) for an assessment
1 of the ￿New Economy￿). An increase in the skill
premium of wages, which has led to increased wage inequality, has been documented
for the US starting at least in the late eighties (Katz and Murphy (1992)). In addition,
structural change has been observed in patterns of organization and factor allocation
at the ￿rm level. Although such organizational changes at the micro level are much
more diﬃcult to quantify than shifts in macroeconomic variables, a number of au-
thors have documented the existence of a trend towards increased decentralization in
the organization of ￿rms, which can be traced back to Piore and Sabel (1984). A
synthetic but informative account of organizational changes since the 1980s can be
found in Rajan and Zingales (1998) and in Aghion et al. (2000). Rajan and Zingales
(1998) describe
2 such changes as an increased recurrence by ￿rms to outsourcing and
the spinning-oﬀ of activities, an increased importance of human capital relative to
physical assets and a wide-spread use of monetary incentive schemes inside the ￿rm.
Aghion et al (2000) characterize recent organizational change as a move toward ￿atter
organizations, which means fewer hierarchical layers and increased decentralization of
decision making in the ￿rm. The decentralized ￿rm replaces vertical (hierarchical)
communication channels with horizontal (more informal) ones. An additional trans-
formation is a trend towards increased segregation of employees skills across working
places, which has been documented by Kremer and Maskin (1996) for some European
countries and the US and by Dunne et al. (1999) for the US. Increased segregation
means that the working place becomes an environment where there is lower skill het-
erogeneity since workers with a given skill level tend to be grouped more often with
workers with similar skills.
Some of these major transformations in microeconomic organization and macro-
economic outcomes have received attention in the literature and a number of theories
have been proposed to account for them. Productivity growth and the increase in
the skill premium have been explained as a consequence of skill-biased technological
change (see for instance Krusell et al. (2000)). Increased segregation may be a con-
sequence of assortative matching, as shown by Kremer and Maskin (1996). However,
the literature seems to have lagged behind in providing an explanation of the apparent
shift in predominant organizational forms at the ￿rm level (which maybe partly due
to the obvious diﬃculties in establishing the relevant stylized facts for the case). Op-
timally, candidate theoretical explanations of the recent transformations in corporate
organization should also contribute (together with other factors like exogenous skill-
biased technological change) to explain aggregate growth and wage inequality, since
technological progress and employees￿ income and skills are largely determined in the
workplace.
1 Other recent contributions on the links between productivity growth and technological change and ￿ rm orga-
nization are Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999) and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999).
2 Correspondingly, a characterization of the previously predominant traditional ￿ rm is in Chandler (1990).
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moreover consistent with the broader picture of macroeconomic developments (higher
productivity growth, movements in the skill premium) should combine at least three
desirable properties. The ￿rst, which is a pre-condition for being able to discuss causes
of corporate decentralization, is that the theory uses as a building block a model of
￿rms￿ boundaries. Secondly, the theoretical framework should provide a well-de￿ned
concept of decentralization and moreover should account for increased use of incentive
schemes at the lower end of the corporate hierarchy. Third, the theory should predict
that ￿rms recur more often to decentralization as a function of changes in exogenous
variables that can be related to observables.
Regarding the ￿rst condition (use of a theory of the ￿rm), there are good reasons
to regard the Arrow-Debreu setting as not fully adequate for this purpose
3.S o m e
form of agency problem should therefore be a central element of the argument. A
consistent framework to model the boundaries of the ￿rm is provided by the property
rights research agenda of Grossman, Hart and Moore
4. Within this line of research,
Grossman and Helpman (1999) derive a model where ￿rm￿s boundaries are deter-
mined endogenously together with market equilibrium. But, arguably, the theory of
￿rm￿s boundaries based on contract incompleteness has diﬃculties in accommodating
the existence of explicit monetary incentive schemes inside the ￿rm, since the theory
builds on the assumption of unveri￿able pro￿t streams. In addition, as argued by
Holmstr￿m and Roberts (1998), other foundations of the theory of the ￿rm diﬀerent
to ex post renegotiation may be possible, which may complement the property rights
v i e w . I nt h i sp a p e rw eb u i l do ni d e a sr e l a t e dt ot h er o l eo ft h e￿rm in knowledge
transfers in a context where ex post renegotiation is absent, in the spirit of Arrow
(1975)
5. Nonetheless, the precise failure of intellectual property rights that we invoke
is diﬀerent to the one in Arrow (1975), which is based on the diﬃculties in trading
information in a setting of asymmetric information. We focus instead on what may be
characterized as a failure of trade secret law or absence of copyrights. In our setting
6,
even if information is complete, trade of knowledge is distorted by parties￿ inability to
contractually prevent the posterior re-sale of the traded knowledge to third parties.
Regarding the second ingredient in a theory of increased decentralization (a model
of delegated authority), the literature provides fewer elements than in the previous
case, as stressed for instance by Hart (1995). Important contributions in this respect
are Aghion and Tirole (1997) and (1995), which develop a theory of decentralization
based on the amount of information that units in a ￿rm are required to share with top
management
7. For the unit, having to report little information acts as a shield against
posterior interventions (and expropriations) by the top. Our concept of decentraliza-
tion (which should be seen as complementary to the previous one) is based precisely
3 For discussions on the limits of the competitive model as a framework to formulate a theory of the ￿ rm see
Tirole (1988), Hart (1988), Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and Aghion et al. (2000).
4 Hart(1995) has an overview of the property rights theory of the ￿ rm. For a discussion on the limitations and
adventages of this strand of the literature see Tirole(1999), Maskin and Tirole (1999), and Hart and Moore (1999).
5 The insight in Arrow (1975) has recently been extended in Anton and Yao (1994) and (1995).
6 See Rodriguez-Palenzuela (1993) for a related but diﬀ erent treatment of this theme.
7 See also Stein (2000) for a very related theory of decentralization based on the nature of information transfered
in the decision-making process.
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when top management provides all its knowledge to the employees and the ￿rm is
centralized when the top transfers only a fraction of its knowledge to employees. In a
setting of imperfect intellectual property rights there is a clear tension between giving
information to employees (and risking leakage of sensible information) and retaining
information at the top (and reducing employees￿ skills).
This paper lays out a simple model aimed at contributing to explain trends in
organizational form and that attempts to satisfy the conditions discussed above. By
making the imperfection of intellectual property rights the center of the analysis we are
able to develop an argument under which the boundaries of the ￿rm are well de￿ned
and ￿rm￿s pro￿ts are veri￿able (so that incentive schemes associate to pro￿ts are well
de￿ned)
8.
The relevance of imperfect intellectual property rights seems to be increasingly
enhanced by recent empirical work. Cohen et al. (2000) conclude from a survey to
1478 R&D research laboratories in the US that secrecy and lead time are the most
important mechanisms [in comparison to patents] to protect the pro￿ts from inven-
tion
9, since weak intellectual property rights protection is pervasive. Regarding time
trends, they ￿nd that for the protection of product innovations, secrecy now seems to
be much more heavily employed across most industries than previously.
10 Additional
evidence of the increasing relevance of intellectual property rights issues is Gans et al.
(2000), who develop a survey to ￿rms to gather information on the strategies in the
Biotechnology sector motivating the small ￿rms￿ decision to commercialize new prod-
ucts in-house or in collaboration with a large, established ￿rm. They report evidence
for imperfections in the ￿market for ideas￿ being a cause of in-house development.
Interestingly, Gans et al. (2000) and Gans and Stern (2000) document the role that
sunk costs of physical assets play in the ￿rm for enhancing the appropriability of the
￿rm￿s intellectual capital.
The imperfection of intellectual property rights implies that entrepreneurs face a
threat of information leakages, initiated typically by employees inside the ￿rm, to-
wards external agents. This undesired ￿ow of information damages the entrepreneur,
particularly when the recipient of the information is a competitor. In this environ-
ment, an important aspect of management eﬀorts is to ￿ght against, and if possible
preempt, undesired out￿ows of information. Indeed, once the importance of imperfect
intellectual property rights has been recognized, the boundaries of the ￿rm can be
interpreted as an (imperfect) substitute of intellectual property rights, namely, as a
contractual device to achieve separation among those that are given access to sensible
information and those for which such information should remain secret.
Imperfect intellectual property rights imply that the interest of the entrepreneur is
to eﬃciently distort the scope of collusive communication between ￿rm￿s members and
8 We model a moral hazard in teams under complete (non-renegotiated) contracts (as in Holmstrom (1978)).
The moral hazard variable here is employees making oﬀ ers to coalitions for the purpose of taking information out
of the ￿ rm.
9 Cited from the authors, Cohen et al. (2000), abstract and section 3.
10Ibidem.
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of employees turnover towards competing ￿rms, the entrepreneur engages in setting
up barriers to workers￿ mobility
11. If communication takes the form of direct collusive
communication between employees and non-members, the entrepreneur has an interest
in undertaking strategic actions and investments that erode the collusion stake. In this
paper we take the view that both channels of communication are relevant in practice,
but we focus the analysis on the second of the two channels
12.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the model
and the main results. Section 3 presents the model. In section 4 we ￿rst derive the
￿rm￿s organization when secrecy can be achieved contractually. We then introduce the
possibility of collusion. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are contained in an Appendix
at the end of the paper.
2 Summary of Model and Results
We consider three types of entrepreneur￿s actions oriented to retaining intellectual
property in the ￿rm through the erosion of collusion stakes: employees￿ incentive
schemes, the strategic investment in physical assets (capacity) and the extent of in-
formation releases to employees by the entrepreneur (which is our characterization of
decentralization).
Regarding the ￿rst one, since leakage of sensible information deteriorates the strate-
gic position of the ￿rm vis a vis competitors, employees￿ incentive schemes improve
their incentives to be secretive with respect to outsiders. The need to give incentive
schemes to employees introduces an (endogenous) cost of increasing the number of em-
ployees: having more employees holding pro￿t related incentives implies the dilution of
stake in the ￿rm
13. The second deterring action is the investment in inanimate assets.
There is an obvious parallel between the role of physical assets to achieve employees
secrecy here and to deter entry by a potential entrant in the Industrial Organization
literature, namely the fact that capacity investments by the incumbent entrepreneur
reduces the returns to entry. The diﬀerence is that here the presence of a potential en-
trant is endogenous and is determined by the existence of collusion between employees
and outsiders. As a result, the role of physical assets in our setting is to anchor sensi-
ble information to the ￿rm, enhancing the protection of the entrepreneur￿s intellectual
property. Finally, the entrepreneur has a margin of action to deter communication
in the degree of secretism he exerts with respect to employees: the cost of having
11This is the route taken by Rajan and Zingales (2000). It should be stressed that theirs is a model of incomplete
contracts: in addition of having employees being able to quit the ￿ rm -taking away sensible knowledge- they assume
the unveri￿ ability of ￿ rm·s accounts. Both features make Rajan and Zingales (2000) very diﬀ erent to our model in
this paper.
12Although it is clear that such collusive communication is unlawful behavior, it may as well be hard to detect
by the court, particularly if the return to communication for employees is delayed in time.
13This follows for instance under limitted liability constraints (which imply a cost of setting employees in an
incentive scheme) or if the ￿ rm￿s budget constraint cannot be ￿broken￿ (i.e., it is not possible or there are no
bene￿ ts to having ex post a wage bill greater than ￿ rm￿s revenues -here we follow this second route).
12                                                             ECB Working Paper Series No 43 l February 2001employees incompletely informed (diskilling) may be compensated by the employees￿
reduced ability to leak out information.
In this paper we lay out a tractable model where the entrepreneur can engage in
these three strategies to enhance appropriability of intellectual property. Our main
result is that under a sensible speci￿cation of the strategic interaction, the strategies
of capacity (sinking the cost of physical assets) and centralization (employees are par-
tially informed by the entrepreneur) complement each other, whereas the strategy of
incentive schemes is substitute of the other two. This implies that two distinct types
of ￿rms predominate: physical assets intensive ￿rms that are centralized and give ￿at
wages to diskilled employees (we call such ￿rms traditional ￿rms), and human capital
intensive ￿rms that are decentralized and give strong incentives to employees, which
have skills similar to those of the entrepreneur. We label this second type the knowl-
edge ￿rm. An additional implication is that there is a discontinuity in the optimal
organizational form as a function of the cost of entry and the level of technological de-
velopment. Under high entry costs and low technological development the traditional
￿rm is more pro￿table than the knowledge ￿r m ,b u t ,b e y o n dag i v e nt r e s h o l d ,d e -
creases in entry costs or increases in technological development make the organization
of the knowledge ￿rm superior to that of the traditional ￿rm.
Intuitively, the argument is the following. Take in the ￿rst place the case with
high entry costs and consider the level of investment in physical assets that is high
enough so that the scope of collusion becomes negligible. The entrepreneur can in
this case hire as many employees as needed and pay them ￿at wages without fear
of information leakages. Since endowing employees with information increases the
chances of collusion, the abundance of workers makes it acceptable to keep them
relatively uninformed and ineﬃcient. At the other extreme, consider a setting where
the sunk costs of physical assets are negligible. Physical assets then do not contribute
to retaining information in the ￿rm. Incentive schemes strategies are now the crucial
element to achieve secrecy. Considerations of dilution of stake in the ￿rm become
important: the ￿rm must therefore economize in the number of employees, that should
be made as eﬃcient (informed) as possible.
Linking the main argument of the model with the initial discussion on structural
transformations in the US, is suggestive of the following interpretation. Increased
competition arising from international trade together with technological developments
that increased the importance of human capital relative to physical capital in the
1980s (like developments in information technology and in general the increased scope
for radical innovations), eroded the strategic value of physical assets to anchor inside
the ￿rm knowledge not protected by intellectual property rights and therefore to de-
velop innovations in large established ￿rms. Predominant organizational forms shifted
towards achieving intellectual property protection through employee ￿empowerment￿
(the combination of full release of information to employees with wide equity-holding
by employees), with direct implications: an increase in the level of employees￿ skills and
the posterior step increases in productivity growth and skill premia in the transformed
￿rms.
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The market for product Q meets in two time periods, t =1 ,2.E a c hp e r i o dt h ei n v e r s e
demand function of the good is Pt(Qt)=Dt−Qt. The good is supplied by i =1 ,..,M t





Production costs depend on the number n
i
t and the skill level θ
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Supply conditions and the timing of production are not equal in periods 1 and 2.
The important diﬀerence between periods is that in period 1 there is one incumbent
￿r mo n l ya n di np e r i o d2c o m p e t i t i o ni se n d o g e n o u s l yd e t e r m i n e d .
First period t =1
In the ￿rst period there is an entrepreneur with skill level ﬂ θ. The entrepreneur
sets up the incumbent ￿rm i =1 : she hires n
1
1 employees and decides the level of
information related to the skill that she wants to disclose to them: θ
1
1 ∈ [0,ﬂ θ] (so that
partial disclosure (θ
1










Employees are given incentives schemes that specify payments contingent on ￿rm￿s







t are ￿rms￿ pro￿ts. Finally,
t h es a l eo fQ
1
1 by ￿rm 1 as a monopolist takes place.
Second period t =2
The incumbent ￿rm has an advantage at production and decides the number of
employees n
1
2 and the total quantity produced Q
1
2 before potential entrants.
After production of Q
1
2 each of the n
1
1 senior employees (those that were present in
the ￿rm at t =1 ) has the ability to secretly make one take it or leave it oﬀer to any set
of agents (the collusive coalition) specifying side-payments among coalition members
and the release of employee j￿s skill level in the previous period (which equals θ
1
1)
to any subset of members of the collusive coalition. If all members of the collusive
coalition accept j￿s oﬀer, trade takes place.
If collusion takes place, informed outsiders become entrants by sinking an entry
cost F = Fo − θ
1
1, which is assumed to be linear for simplicity. Entrants decide the
quantity Q
i
2,i 6=1taking the incumbents quantity as given. Finally, the market for
product Q meets at the end of the second period.
The timing of the strategic interaction is summarized as follows.
t =1
1. The incumbent sets up ￿rm i =1 .
2. Final market for Q meets.
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1. The incumbent sets up ￿rm i =1 .
2. Senior employees make collusive oﬀers. Oﬀers accepted or rejected.
3. Entry by informed outsiders takes place.
4. Final market for Q meets.
We assume that agents are not liquidity constrained, so that teams are organized in
order to maximize members￿ joint surplus. Information is complete. In particular and
regarding skill θ, we assume that agents can disentangle the knowledge that enhances
skill levels from the knowledge that allows the valuation of the skill level. This implies
that if agent j has skill level θ she can proof to agent k that j￿s skill level is θ without
increasing the skills of agent k. Finally, collusive communication and side-transfers
among employees and outsiders are not veri￿able by a court.
4R e s u l t s
In this section we ￿rst derive the entrepreneur￿s organization when communication
between her employees and outsiders can be avoided contractually. We then derive the
optimal organization of the ￿rm when collusion between members and non-members
is possible.
4.1 First-Best allocation




































which has a straightforward solution:
Result 1: under veri￿able communication, in equilibrium there is:
• Only one ￿rm at t =1(the entrepreneur￿s ￿rm i =1 )
• Full information sharing: θ
1
1 = ﬂ θ
• q
ij
t (∗) is arbitrarily small and n
1







• The optimal quantity Q
1
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is mute on the team members￿ incentives scheme w
j (.,.). When the entrepreneur has
the possibility to restrict communication between members and non-members, this
restriction is used to avoid entry and competition in the ￿nal market.
4.2 Collusion with outsiders
Consider in the ￿rst place the entrepreneur￿s objective function. From the absence of
liquidity constraints the entrepreneur maximizes her ￿rm￿s surplus plus the employees




































t are rents from collusive communication obtained by employee j in period t.
There are two diﬀerences between expression (2) and entrepreneur￿s objective func-
tion under veri￿able communication in (1). The ￿rst one is that in (2) the amount
supplied by the incumbent ￿rm Q
1
2 and total market supply Q2 in the second period
are not necessarily the same. The second diﬀerence is that under no liquidity con-
straints the entrepreneur captures the possible gains from employees￿ collusion with
outsiders, given by the term r
j
t in (2). These diﬀerences arise from the possibility
of collusive communication between members of the entrepreneur￿s network and non-
members. Communication ultimately determines entry. The entrepreneur aﬀects entry
conditions through the strategic organization of the ￿rm.
In order to derive the solution to (2) we ￿rst characterize two properties of the
solution in Lemmas 1 and 2, derive the optimal incentive scheme in period 2 and
￿nally characterize comparative static properties of the equilibrium with respect to
entry costs (Fo) and the level of expertise introduced by the entrepreneur (θ).
4.2.1 Production at t =2
In the second period information leakages are not a concern for any ￿rm (since there
are no subsequent periods) and therefore there are no productive distortions. The
following results is straightforward.
Lemma 1: All ￿rms in period t =2produce Q
i





2 = θ and n
i
2 →∞ .
Second period costs are therefore negligible in all ￿rms. Firms that enter in the
second period simultaneously react to the incumbents production at t =2 .I f ￿rm
i 6=1expects the other ￿rms to produce Q
−i
















units. Lemma 1 shows that the incumbent is better oﬀ deterring entrants￿ production
at t =2 .
Lemma 2 : In equilibrium, collusive communication is deterred.
Proof: in the Appendix
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t h eo n l yr o l eo fa l l o w i n ge n t r yb ys o m e￿rms is to introduce competition so as to
discourage further entry by additional ￿rms. Lemma 2 shows that the incumbent is
better oﬀ playing this entry-deterring role himself.
4.2.2 Optimal incentive schemes
In order to identify the incumbent￿s optimal deterring strategy, consider the employees￿
incentive compatibility constraint for secrecy. From Lemma 1 the relevant condition for
information leakages that we should consider is the one governing the decision to diﬀuse
by one employee only. Clearly this condition is not aﬀected by employees￿ retribution





i￿s pro￿ts (gross of entry costs) when there are Mt−1 entrants and the incumbent has
produced Q
1



















T h el e f th a n ds i d eo f( 3 )i st h ee m p l o y e e ￿ ss t a k ei nt h ei n c u m b e n t￿rm when she
refrains from selling information. The right hand side is that stake when she sells the
skill to an outsider, plus the gains from entry, which are captured by the information
seller.
Intuitively, the secrecy condition (3) reveals that there are three types of strategies
available to the incumbent ￿rm in order to deter communication between employees
and outsiders. The ￿rst type can be labelled a physical assets strategy: By increasing
t h es e c o n dp e r i o dq u a n t i t yQ
1
2 the incumbent ￿rm hurts potential entrants more than
what it hurts itself. The former eﬀect is given by ∂π
2/∂Q
1
2 which is typically more
















2. Physical assets play the role of improving
appropriability conditions inside the ￿rm.
The second type of deterring strategy is secrecy. By engaging in partial disclosure
in her own ￿rm at t =1(i.e., θ
1
1 < θ) the entrepreneur increases the entry cost of
an outsider that communicates with an employee, which reduces the collusion stake.



















i sl a r g e . L e m m a3s h o w st h a t ,
in spite of employees unlimited liability, the threat of collusion among stake holders
(which includes non-employees) prevents making ∆w
j
2 arbitrarily large. The secrecy
constraint will be binding in equilibrium.
Lemma 3 : Uninformed agents are given no stake in the incumbent￿s ￿rm. Moreover,
optimal incentives schemes are linear in incumbent￿s ￿rm pro￿ts.
Proof: in the Appendix
The ￿rst part of the claim in Lemma 3 (only employees are stake-holders) is that
there are no gains of creating a sink of ex ante contributions, that is distributed ex
post depending on performance. This result hinges on the assumption that money
cannot be destroyed in any case ex post. The argument is that if a third-party who is
not informed about θ is made residual claimant to the sink under information leakages,
ECB Working Paper Series No 43 l February 2001                                              17this creates incentives for employees to make collusive oﬀers (that are accepted) to a
coalition that includes the claimant to the sink. Secrecy fails.
The second part of the claim (linearity is optimal) intuitively follows from the fact
that built-in non-linearities in the incentive scheme originates arbitrage opportunities
at the collusion game, violating secrecy. Absence of liquidity constraints together with
linear incentive schemes are interpreted as employees purchasing ￿rm￿s equity at the
outset of the employment relationship. In particular, the result is that it is optimal to






1 for all j and
t).





















2) ≥ 0 (4)
which is satis￿ed with equality in equilibrium since hiring one more employee without
violating (4) always increases pro￿ts.
4.2.3 Optimal corporate organization.





































2) is de￿ned in (4).
Comparison of (1) and (5) reveals three trade-oﬀs due to information spillovers.
Firstly, regarding knowledge diﬀusion, there is a motivation to release information
to reduce costs. But transparency inside the ￿rm implies facilitating entry through
employees collusion (since Fθ < 0, rθ in (5) is positive). Secondly, regarding ￿rm size,
there is a cost reduction motivation to hire more employees in the ￿rst period. But
increasing ￿rst period employees (everything else given) increases dilution of members￿
stakes, facilitating collusion. Finally, regarding capacity Q
1
2, there are bene￿ts of
increasing capacity in the second period (collusion stake is reduced). But increasing
capacity reduces the incumbent pro￿ts, as prices drop below optimal levels.





2) is positive or zero
14 at the solution. The following de￿nition will be used:




2)=0 , the incumbent ￿rm is called a ￿tradi-
tional￿ ￿rm . Otherwise it is called a ￿knowledge-￿rm￿.
We ￿rst characterize each type of solution and then show that under large entry
costs the incumbent ￿rm is traditional and under low entry costs it is a knowledge
￿rm.
14r is always non-negative














The important point is that the traditional ￿rm does not distort ￿rst period produc-
tion: by making collusion stake vanish in the second period, collusion is deterred even
if employees have no stake in the ￿rm. The collusion stake vanishes only if Q
1
2 is
suﬃciently high (overproduction) and θ
1
1 is suﬃciently low (secrecy). This is formally
shown in:
Lemma 4 : In the traditional ￿rm there is under-provision of skills, θ
1
1 = θ and





Proof: in the Appendix
The knowledge ﬁrm corresponds to interior solutions (with respect to Q
1
2)o f
(5). Although such an interior solution may not exist, if it exist it satis￿es:




2(∗) and has a





Proof: in the Appendix
The knowledge ￿rm has greater pressure to disclose information since it is limiting
the number of employees in the ￿rst period, which exacerbates ￿rst period produc-
tion ineﬃciencies. In particular, we show that if entry costs are suﬃciently low, the
knowledge ￿rm engages in full information disclosure to employees and moreover the
knowledge ￿rm overperforms the traditional ￿rm. On the contrary, if entry costs are
suﬃciently high the traditional ￿rm engages in secrecy (minimal information disclo-








¢2 . ￿ Fo is the lowest level of the entry costs component compati-
ble with secrecy under ￿rst best capacity and full information release inside the ￿rm.
Clearly, the non-trivial cases to consider correspond to Fo < ￿ Fo.
Proposition 1: There are two values (F o,Fo) with F o < Fo < ￿ Fo, such that, if Fo >
F0 then the solution satis￿es: θ
1
1 = θ, r(θ,Q
1
2)=0(i.e., the ￿rm is ￿traditional￿). If
Fo <F 0 then at the solution: θ
1
1 = θ and r(θ,Q
1
2) > 0 (i.e., it is a ￿knowledge ￿rm￿).
Moreover, for any non-trivial value of Fo, there is a value θ suﬃc i e n t l yh i g hs u c ht h a t
the knowledge ￿rm dominates the traditional ￿rm and θ
1
1 = θ.
Proof in the Appendix.
The interpretation of Proposition 1 is that the traditional ￿rm is more eﬃcient at
reducing ￿rst period costs, since it bene￿ts from the increasing marginal costs technol-
ogy by hiring ￿many￿ marginal employees. The traditional ￿r mc a na c c o m p l i s ht h i s
since it attains secrecy even under full stake dilution. On the other hand, the tradi-
tional ￿rm is restricted in general to overproduce: to preempt communication while
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level, reducing pro￿ts. The overall eﬃciency of the traditional ￿rm depends on entry
costs being high. High entry costs facilitate the preemption of communication.
The knowledge ￿rm is less cost eﬃcient since employees work at marginal costs
bounded away from zero. The bene￿to ft h ek n o w l e d g e￿rm is not necessarily that
it produces output relatively closer to the monopolist revenue maximizing output.
Rather, the bene￿t of the knowledge ￿rm is that it is robust to the reduction of
entry costs. In particular, the knowledge ￿rm yields positive pro￿ts from ￿rst stage
production when technological entry costs are zero (whereas the traditional ￿rm yields
zero pro￿ts from second stage production in this case). This is because the knowledge
￿rm hinges on the principle of keeping ￿small￿ teams (although not necessarily small
output -relative to the traditional ￿rm) so as to facilitate secrecy in the original team.
In summary, high entry costs favor the ￿communication preemption strategy￿,
whereas the pro￿ts from the ￿small team strategy￿ are robust to nil entry costs.
Moreover, a greater level of expertise introduced by the entrepreneur in the ￿rst place
(θ) favors the knowledge ￿rm strategy.
Allowing the demand function change over time better illustrates the eﬃciency of
the traditional ￿rm to protect present rents relative to future rents and correspondingly
the superiority of the knowledge ￿rm to protect future rents at the sake of present rents.
This is shown in:
Proposition 2: Let D1 6= D2 : If the maturity of the industry ￿ ≡
D1
D2 is high enough
the traditional ￿rm dominates the knowledge ￿rm. If ￿ is low enough (the industry
is immature enough) the knowledge ￿rm dominates the traditional ￿rm.
Since the traditional ￿rm distorts relatively more the second period pro￿ts, it is
preferred when ￿rst stage production is relatively more important. We interpret this
￿nding as a relative advantage of the traditional ￿rm in mature sectors. Symmet-
rically, since the knowledge ￿rm distorts relatively more the allocation of ￿rst stage
production, it is preferred when second stage market is larger than the ￿rst (i.e., when
the industrial sector is immature).
5C o n c l u s i o n
I nt h i sp a p e rw et a k ead i ﬀerent approach than the incomplete contracts literature
to model ￿rm￿s boundaries and internal organization. We build on the imperfection
of intellectual property rights as the central motivation for the organization of ￿rms.
The importance of this topic has been recognized since Arrow (1975) and has received
increased attention in the empirical and theoretical literatures in the last years. We
argue that there are a number of appealing characteristics of a theory of the ￿rm
grounded on the absence of intellectual property rights and that such theory comple-
ments well the incomplete contracts approach (particularly when applied to innovation
intensive environments).
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we lay out are the following. First, monetary incentive schemes arise naturally as an el-
ement of the organization and strategy of the ￿rm, since pro￿ts are veri￿able. Second,
￿rm￿s boundaries and the degree of centralization respond to the same economic princi-
ple of compromising between productive eﬃciency (releasing knowledge to employees)
and the probability of undesired information spillovers. Third, the sunk cost of physi-
cal assets plays in the setting a speci￿c role of ￿anchoring￿ non-patentable knowledge
inside the ￿rm, improving the appropriability of intellectual capital. Finally, the model
implies that ￿small￿ changes in primitives (particularly small reductions in entry costs)
may have drastic implications in organizations, inducing ￿r m st os h i f tf r o mas t r a t -
egy of building up physical capital, which improves appropriability, to a strategy of
reliance on employee ￿empowerment￿ (under which employees combine equity holding
with being fully informed ). The former strategy is characterized instead by ￿at wages
and by employees￿ restricted access to the intellectual capital of the ￿rm. The model
may shed light in the theoretical explanation of observed industrial restructuring.
Two main policy implications may be drawn from the theory. First, the model
suggests that restrictions to use stock option schemes and, more generally, restric-
tions to wage ￿exibility inside the ￿rm -like collective bargaining arrangements- have
welfare reducing eﬀects. Incentive schemes and payment policies are an important
instrument for the retention of the intellectual capital of the ￿rm and therefore for the
entrepreneur￿s ability to fully internalize the returns to innovative activities. There
should be therefore welfare gains from achieving redistributive social policies through
specialized instruments like income taxation alone, as opposed to a situation where
several policy instruments (income taxation, collective bargaining) -some of which
create allocative distortions- overlap.
The second policy implication relates to the importance of knowledge externali-
ties, which occurs if the knowledge produced in ￿rms has social value in addition to
its private value within the ￿rm. If knowledge externalities are suﬃciently important,
centralized con￿gurations where employees do not access to the knowledge stock of
the entrepreneur are inferior in terms of welfare to decentralized organizations, where
knowledge is widely transferred. In sectors where knowledge externalities are believed
to be sizeable, policy action should aim, with particular strength, at promoting com-
petition and eliminating entry barriers. Competition policy facilitates the conditions
to promote the ￿knowledge ￿rm￿, since decentralization promotes a faster diﬀusion
of knowledge while still contributing to the appropriability of the ￿rm￿s intellectual
capital.
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P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :
C o n s i d e rt h eg a m ea tt =2 . Incentive schemes and the number of employees in ￿rm 1 in
period 1 are given. For clarity we drop the time subindexes t. Consider an equilibrium
with total product quantity Q>Q
1 and M−1 entrants, i =2 ,..,M.L e tQ
i(M−1,Q
1)





















1). Now consider the incumbent￿s alternative
strategy: ￿ Q





















The last inequality means that by producing ￿ Q
1 the incumbent is deterring all entry,
since ￿ Q





Now, under the original strategy the incumbent obtains less than under the deterring
strategy ￿ Q
1 = Q, since: Q
1P(Q) <Q P(Q). This contradicts the original equilibrium.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :
In what follows we drop the time subscript for all variables that refer to period 2. De￿ne








1) is de￿ned as
in the text. Moreover, let R ≡ π
2(1,Q










Let s =1 ,..,Sb ea ni n d e xo ft h es e to fs t a k e h o l d e r sS (employees plus non-employees)
and let σ be a subset of S.N o t i c et h a tt h es u ﬃcient condition for the incumbent ￿rm




s) − R} < 0. Since income is





















We ￿rst prove the ￿rst claim for the case when there is one uninformed stakeholder
(it is straightforward to extend it to an arbitrary number). With one uninformed
stakeholder s =0there are n
1
1+1stakeholders (s =0 ,..,n
1
1). The optimality condition
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0 ≡ (w
0 − w
0) and consider in the ￿rst place the case A
0 > 0. Then give the




solution is improved and A
0 > 0 cannot be optimal.
Consider the case A















0 and the solution is clearly improved and A
0 < 0 is
not optimal.
Finally if A
0 =0this implies no gains of giving stake to an uninformed agent when
w
0 = w
0 > 0 (notice that when w
0 = w
0 =0the uninformed agent is being given no
stake).
The second claim of the Lemma is that incumbent￿s ￿rm equity is equally split among
the set of employees j =1 ,..,n
1
1 Given linearity, no income destruction and the ￿rst
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1).B u ts i n c ej
0 is the solution













j=1 is a solution.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 :
Recall that Fo < (
D
4 )
2 so that we are ruling out the trivial case where communication
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Consider in the ￿rst place the case: Fo − θ > 0.D e ￿ne z2 ≡ Q
1
2 − D/2.I t i s c l e a r
that the last two terms of (8) are symmetric functions of z2.S i n c e t h e ￿rst term in
(8) is always positive, an interior solution satis￿es the ￿rst claim. The second claim is





P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 : Consider the case Fo = ￿ Fo. The traditional ￿rm clearly
achieves total pro￿ts arbitrarily close to ￿rst-best pro￿ts. The knowledge ￿rm achieves




2) > 0.M o r e o v e r , i n t h e
interval (F
0
o, ￿ Fo),w h e r eF
0
o ≡ D
2/4 the traditional ￿rm pro￿ts are constant as a
function of Fo. Finally, the derivative of total pro￿ts with respect to Fo at F
0
o is zero




















The knowledge ￿rm￿s pro￿ts strictly decrease as Fo decreases in (F
0
o, ￿ Fo since ∂V
∂Fo > 0
where V is de￿n e di n( 5 ) .T h e r e f o r et h e r ei sa ni n t e r v a l(F
0
o, ￿ Fo with F o < F
0
o where
the traditional ￿rm strategy dominates the knowledge ￿rm strategy.
Consider now the case Fo =0 . Traditional ￿rm￿s pro￿ts are: π
1





















which proves the claim.
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